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use#LAAWHY THEY HATE US: THE ROLE 
OF SOCIAL DYNAMICS 
CAS  R. SUNSTEIN’ 
I.  THETHESIS 
My goal in this brief  Essay is to cast some new light on a 
question that has been much discussed in the aftermath of  the 
attacks of September 11. The question is simple: why  do they 
hate  us? I suggest that a large part of  the answer lies, not in 
anything particular to Islam, to religion, or even to the ravings 
of  Osama bin Laden, but in socia!  dynamics and especially in 
the process of  group polarization.  When group polarization is 
at work, like-minded people, engaged in discussion with one 
another,  move  toward  extreme  positions.  The  effect  is 
especially strong with people who are already quite extreme; 
such people can move in  literally  dangerous directions. It is 
unfortunate  but  true  that  leaders  of  terrorist  organizations 
show  a  working  knowledge  of  group  polarization.  They 
sharply discipline what is said. They  attempt to inculcate a 
shared sense of  humiliation, which  breeds  rage,  and  group 
solidarity,  which  prepares  the  way  for  movement  toward 
further extremes and hence for violent acts. They attempt to 
ensure that recruits speak mostly to people who are already 
predisposed in the preferred direction. They produce a cult-like 
atmosphere. 
With  an understanding of  group polarization, we can see 
that when “they hate us,” it is often because of  social processes 
that have been  self-consciously  created and manipulated by 
terrorist  leaders.  These  social  processes  could  easily  be 
otherwise. If they were, terrorism would not exist, or at least it 
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would  be  greatly  weakened  and  its  prospects  would  be 
diminished.  There  is  no  natural  predisposition  toward 
terrorism,  even  among  the  most  disaffected  people  in  the 
poorest nations. When terroris?  occurs, it is typically a result 
of  emphatically social pressures  and indeed easily identifiable 
mechanisms of  interaction. More broadly, ethnic identific3tion 
and  ethnic  conflict  are  a  product  of  similar  pressures;  an 
understanding of  "why they hate US"  is thus likely to promote 
an increased understanding of  social hatred in general. 
We  can  draw  some  conclusions  here  for  the  law  of 
conspiracy, for freedom of  association, for the idea of  "political 
correctness,"  for  the  system of  checks and balances,  and for 
possible responses to terrorist threats. Thus  I shall identdy the 
distinctive logic behind the special punishment of  conspiracy: 
those who conspire are likely to move one another in more 
extreme and hence more dangerous directions. I shall also urge 
that freedom of  association helps to fuel group polarization-  a 
healthy  phenomenon  much  of  the  time,  but  a  potentially 
dangerous one in some contexts. I shall urge, finally, that an 
especially  effective way  to  prevent  terrorism is  to  prevent 
"terrorist entrepreneurs" from creating special enclaves of  like- 
minded  or  potentially  like-minded  people.  It  might  seem 
tempting to  object  to  such efforts on the  ground  that  they 
interfere with associational liberty, which is of  course prized in 
all democratic nations. But we are speaking here of  terrorism 
and conspiracy  to kill American citizens; in  such  cases,  the 
claims for associational liberty are very weak. Conspiracy is the 
dark  side  of  freedom  of  association,  and  it  is  a  form  of 
conspiracy that I am discussing here. One of  my largest goals is 
thus to provide a window on the nature and consequences of 
conspiracy in the particular context of  terrorism. 
2.  I do not mean to deny the possibility of  lone terrorists, or the potential role of 
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11.  THE  BASIC  PHENOMENON 
A.  What Groups Do 
Let  us begin with some social science research that seems 
very far afield from the area of terrorism. In 1962, J.A.F.  Stoner, 
an enterprising graduate student, attempted  to  examine the 
relationshie  between  individual  judgments  and  group 
judgments. He did so against a background belief  that groups 
tended  to  move  toward  the  middle of  their  members’  pre- 
deliberation views. Stoner proceeded by asking people a range 
of  questions involving risk-taking behavior. People were asked, 
for example, whether someone should choose a safe or risky 
play in the last seconds of  a football game; whether someone 
should invest money  in a low-return, high-security stock or 
instead a high-return, lower security stock; whether someone 
should choose a high prestige graduate program in which a 
number of  people fail to graduate or a lower prestige school 
from which everyone graduates. 
In  Stoner’s  studies,  the  subjects  first  studied  the  various 
problems and recorded  an initial judgment; they were then 
asked to reach a unanimous decision as a group. People were 
finally asked to state their private judgments after the group 
judgment had  been  made;  they  were  informed  that  it  was 
acceptable for the private judgment to differ from the group 
judgment. What happened? For twelve of  the thirteen groups, 
the group decisions showed a repeated pattern toward greater 
risk-taking. In addition, there was a clear shift toward greater 
risk-taking in private opinions as well. Stoner therefore found a 
“risky shift,” in which  the effect  of  group dynamics was to 
move  groups,  and  the  individuals that  composed  them,  in 
favor of  increased risk-taking. 
What  accounts for  this  remarkable  result? The  answer  is 
emphatically not that groups always move toward greater risk- 
taking. Some groups-  asking, for example, about whether and 
when someone should get married, or travel despite a possibly 
serious  medical  condition-tend  to  move  toward  greater 
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caution.  Subsequent studies have shown a consistent pattern, 
one that readily explains Stoner’s own findings: deliberating 
groups tend to move toward a mole extreme point in line with 
their  pre-deliberation tendencies.  If  like-minded  people are 
talking with one another, they are likely to end up thinking a 
more extreme version of  what they thought before they started 
to talk. It follows that, for example, a group of  people who tend 
to  approve  of  an  ongoing  war  effort  will,  as a  result  of 
discussion, become still more enthusiastic about that effort; that 
people who think that environmentalists are basically  right, 
and that the planet is in  serious trouble,  will  become quite 
alarmed if they talk mostly with one another; that people who 
tend  to  dislike  the  Rehnquist  Court  will  dislike  it  quite 
intensely after talking about it with one another; that people 
who disapprove of  the United States, and are suspicious of  its 
intentions, will increase their disapproval and suspicion if they 
exchange points of  view. Indeed, there is specifif  evidence of 
the latter phenomenon among citizens of  France.  It should be 
readily apparent that enclaves of  people, inclined to terrorist 
violence,  might  move  sharply  in  that  direction  as  a 
consequence of  internal deliberations. 
Three aggravating factors are of  special relevance to the issue 
of terrorism. First, if members of  the group think that they have 
a shared identity, and a Vgh degree of  solidarity, there will be 
heightened  polarization.  One reason  is  that  if  people  feel 
united  by  some  factor (for  example,  politics  or  necessity), 
internal dissent will be  dampened. Second, if members of  the 
deliberating ~oup  are connected by affective ties, polarization 
will increase.  If  they tend to perceive one another as friendly, 
likable, and spar  to them, the size and likelihood of  the shift 
will  increase.  These points obviously bear  on the cult-like 
5 
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features of  terrorist  organizations, in  which  shared identity 
helps fuel movement toward extremes. Third,  extremists are 
especially  prone  to  polarization.  When  they  start  out  an 
extreme  point,  they  are  likely  t?, go  much  further  in  the 
direction with which they started.  Note in this regard that, 
burglars  inl:  group  act  more  recklessly  than  they  do as 
individuals. 
B.  my  Polarization? 
What  explains these  movements? And  what  explains  the 
aggravating factors? It  is  tempting to  think  that  conformity 
plays a large role. Conformity may  be at work, but the data 
make  clear  that  group  polarization  is  not  a  matter  of 
conformity; people do not $imply  shift to the mean of  their 
respective  initial positions.  In  fact  there are  two principal 
explanations for  group polarization, involving  two different 
 mechanism^.'^  Each  of  the  mechanisms  plays  a  role  in 
producing group  polarization and,  as we shall see,  each  of 
them plays a role in terrorist organizations. 
The first is based  on persuasive  arguments. The simple idea 
here is that people respond to the arguments made by  others, 
and  the  "argument  pool,"  in  a  group  with  some  initial 
disposition in one direction, will inevitably be skewed toward 
that disposition. A group whose members tend to think that 
that they call "a self-categorization  theory of  group polarization."  Id. at 154.  In this 
account,  "persuasion is  dependent  upon  self-categorizations which  create  a 
common  identity within a  group,"  and polarization  occurs "because  group 
members adjust their opinion in line with  their  image of  the group position 
(conform) and more extreme, already polarized, prototypical responses  determine 
this ima e."  Id. at 156.  The  point here is that when a grou  is  tending in a 
certain cfrection, the perceiv~''pr0totype" is determined by w  K  ere the group is 
leaning, and  this is  where individuals will  shift. See id. at 156. As  the authom 
with  many  aspects  of  social  acknowledge,  their  account  shows 
n and persuasive arguments mode  ,"  id. at 158, and because of  the 
predictions and supporting  evidence, see id. at 158-70. 
"over'aE 
not discuss it as a separate account here. For possible differences in 
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the United  States is  engaged  in a  general campaign  against 
Islam, or that it seeks to kill  and humiliate Muslims as such, 
will  hear  many  arguments to that  effect,  and few  opposing 
arguments,  simply  as  a  result  of  the  initial  distribution  of 
positions within  the group. If  people are listening, they will 
have a stronger conviction, in the same direction from which 
they  began,  as  a result  of  deliberation. The phenomenon is 
general. A group whose members tend to oppose affirmative 
action  will  hear  a  large  number  of  arguments  in  favor  of 
abolishing  affirmative  action,  and  a  comparatively  fewer 
number of  arguments for  retaining it. There is considerable 
empirical support for the view th;tf the argument pool has this 
kind of  effect on individual views. 
The second mechanism has to do with social influence. The 
central idea here is  that people have a certain conception of 
themselves and a corresponding sense of  how they would like 
to  be  perceived  by  others.  Most  people  like  to  think  of 
themselves as not identical to but as different from others, but 
only in the right direction and to the right extent. If  you think 
of  yourself as the sort of  person who opposes gun control more 
than most people do (because, hypothetically, you think that 
you  are  unusually  disposed  to  reject  liberal homilies), you 
might shift your position once you find yourself in a group that 
is very strongly opposed to gun control. If  you stay where you 
were,  you  may  seem more  favorably  disposed  toward  gun 
control  than  most  group  members,  and  this  may  be 
disconcerting,  thus producing a shift. If  you  are ill-disposed 
toward  the  West,  and  believe  that  Resident  Bush  has 
imperialistic ambitions, and find yourself in a group with those 
same beliefs,  you  might  well  move toward  a more extreme 
point, simply in order to maintain your preferred relationship 
to  the  views  of  others.  Or  if  you  believe  that  you  have  a 
comparatively  favorable  attitude  toward  affirmative  action, 
discussion  with  a  group  whose  members  are  at  least  as 
favorable as you are might well push you in the direction of 
greater enthusiasm for it. Having heard group members, you 
might move your stated position, simply in order to maintain a 
certain  self-conception  and  reputation,  as  one  who  likes 
affirmative action  a bit  more  than most  people do.  There is 
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evidence that social influence is an independent factor behind 
group polarization; consider in particular  the fact  that mere 
exposure to  the  views  of  oihers can  have  this  effect,  even 
without any discussion at all. 
There is another point, not stressed in social science research 
on  group  polarization,  but  much  bearing  on  the  general 
phenomenon  and  in  particular  on  the  nature  and  rise  of 
terrorism. Many people, much of  the time, lack full confidence 
in their views;  such people offer a moderate version of  their 
views, for fear of  being marginalized or ostracized. Many other 
people have more confidence than they are willing to show, for 
fear of being proved foolish; such  people moderate their views 
in  public.  In  either  case,  group  dynamics can push people 
toward a more extreme position. Moderate skepticism about 
the  problem  of  global  warming might  turn into  full-blown 
disbelief, if  the moderate skeptic finds himself  in  a group of 
people who also tend  toward skepticism. I believe that this 
phenomenon  plays  an important  role  in  terrorist  enclaves, 
which  often  involve  young  men  who  could  not  possibly 
maintain  their  position  if  not  for  the  support  and 
encouragement of  like-minded  others. I  now  turn  to  some 
details. 
111.  TERRORIST  LEADERs AS POLARIzAnON ENTREPRENEURs 
Terrorist  leaders  act  as  polarization  entrepreneurs.  They 
create enclaves of  like-minded people.  They stifle dissenting 
views and do not  tolerate internal disagreement. They  take 
steps  to  ensure  a  high  degree  of  internal  solidarity. They 
restrict the relevant argument pool and take full advantage of 
reputational forces, above all by  using the incentive of  group 
approval. Terrorist  acts  themselves  are  motivated  by  these 
forces  and  incentives.  Consider, for  example,  the  following 
account: 
Terrorists do not even consider that they may  be wrong and 
that others' views may have some merit. .  . .  They attribute 
only evil motives to anyone outside their own group. The. .  . 
common  characteristic  of  the  psychologically  motivated 
terrorist is the pronounced need to belong to a group. . . . 
~~ 
16. See Man.  I. Teger & Dean G.  huitt, Components ojGroup Risk-Taking, 3 J. 
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Such  individuals  define  their  social  status  by  group 
acceptance. 
Terrorist groups with strong internal motivations find it 
necessary to jus*  the group’s existence continuously. A 
terrorist group must terrorize. As [sic] a minimum, it must 
commit  violent  acts  to  maintain  group  self-esteem  and 
legitimacy. Thus, terrorists sometimes carry out attacks that 
are objectively nonproductive or even counterproductive to 
their announced goal.” 
In  fact,  terrorist  organizations  impose  psychological 
pressures to accelerate the  movement in  extreme directions. 
Here too group membership plays a key role: 
Another result of  psychological motivation is the intensity of 
group dynamics among terrorists.  They  tend  to  demand 
unanimity and  be  intolerant of  dissent. With  the  enemy 
clearly identified and unequivocally evil, pressure to escalate 
the frequency and intensity of  operations is ever present. 
The need to belong to the group discourages resignations, 
and  the  fear  of  compromise  disallows  their  acceptance. 
Compromise is rejected, and terrorist groups lean toward 
maximalist  positions.  . . . In  societies  in  which  people 
idenhfy themselves in terms of  group membership (family, 
clan,  tribe),  there  may,  be  a  willingness  to  self-sacrifice 
seldom seen elsewhere. 
Training routines specifically reinforce the basic message of 
solidarity  amidst  humiliation.  Hitler  similarly  attempted  to 
create  group  membership,  and  to  fuel  movements  toward 
extremes, by stressing the suffering and the humiliation of  the 
German people. This is a characteris/t$  strategy of  terrorists of 
all stripes, for humiliation fuels rage.  “Many al-Qaida trainees 
saw videos. . . daily as part of  their training routine. Showing 
hundreds of  hours of  Muslims in dire straits-Palestinians  . . . 
Bosnians . . . Chechens . . . Iraqi children-  [was] all  part of  al- 
Qaida‘s induction strategy.”20  In  the particular context of  Al 
Qaeda, there is a pervasive effort to link Muslims all over the 
globe,  above all  by  emphasizing a  shared identity,  one that 
17. Terrorism Research Center, The Basics of Terrorism: Part 2: The Terrorists, at 
http://www.geocities.com/~pito~ll/2468/bpart2  (Dec. 16,2001). 
18. Id. 
19. On  humiliation,  see  enerally  AVISHAI  MARGALIT,  THE  DECENT 
(Naomi Goldblum trans.,  1585). 
20.  Giles Foden, Secrets of  a  Terror Merchant, MELBOURNE  AGE,  Sept. 14, 2001, 
available  ot  http://www.theage.coaau/news/world/2001/09/14/FFXlONZFJ 
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includes some and excludes others. Thus Osama bin  Laden 
"appeals to a pervasive sense of  humiliation and powerlessness 
in Islamic countries. Muslims are victims the world over . . , 
Bosnia, Somalia, Palestine, Chechnya, and . . .  Saudi Arabia . . . . 
[H]e makes the world  simple for  people who are otherwise 
confused, and gives them a sense of  mission.112'  Hence there are 
unmistakable  cult-like  features  to  the  indoctrination effort: 
"[Tlhe military training [in A1  Qaeda camps] is accompanied 
by  forceful religious indoctrination, with recruits being fed a 
stream  of  anti-Western  propaganda  and  Being  incessantly 
reminded about their duty to perform jihad." 
In addition, the A1 Qaeda terrorists are taught to believe that 
they are 
not alone . . . but  sacrificing themselves as part  of  a larger 
group for what they believe is the greater good.  [The men 
are] recruited as teenagers, when self-esteem and separation 
from  family  are  huge  developmental  issues.  [The 
indoctrination] involves not only lessons in weaponry but an 
almost cult-like brainwashing over many  months. Among 
Muslims, the regimen typically incldes extended periods of 
prayer and a distortion of  the Koran. 
Intense  connections  are  built  into  the  structure:  "The 
structure of  Al Qaeda, an all-male enterprise . . . ,  appears to 
involve small groups of  relatively young men who maintain 
strong  bonds  with  each  other,  bonds  whose  intensity  is 
dramatised and heightened by  the secreq4demanded by  their 
missions and the danger of  their projects." 
This discussion, brief as it is, should be sufficient to show the 
central role of  group dynamics in producing terrorists, and 
indeed  in  answering  the  question  "why  they  hate  US." 
Terrorists are made, not born. More particularly, terrorists are 
made  through  emphatically  social  processes.  Things  could 
easily be otherwise. With respect to social concern with risks, it 
is  possible  to  imagine  multiple  equilibria -  different  social 
situations, all of  them stable, in  which people are concerned 
21. Jeffrey  Bartholet, Method To the Mudness, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 22,2001,  at 55. 
22. Stephen  Grey  & Dipesh Gadher,  Imide  Bin  Lrrden's  Acudemies  of  Terror, 
23. Margery Eagan, Attack on America: It Could be the Terrorist Next Door-Zealot 
24. Vithal C Nadkami, How  IO  Win Over Foes and Influence Their Minds, TbES OF 
SUNDAY TlME  (LONDON), oct.  7,2001,  at 10. 
Hides Behind His Benign Face, BosroN HERALD,  Sept. 13,2001,  at 30. 
INDIA, Oct. 7,  2001,  uvailable at 2001 WL 28702843. 438  Haward Journal of Law & Public Policy  [Vol. 25 
with some risks but not others.  People in France are not much 
concerned  about  nuclear  power,  which  frightens  many 
Americans; people in America are not much concerned about 
genetically engineered food, which frightens Europeans. Timur 
Kuran  has  shown  that  “ethnification”  -close  identification 
with  one’s  ethnic group,  in  a  way  that  involves  hatred  of 
others -  is  not  a  matter  of  history  but  o!~  current  social 
processes, closely akin to those discussed here.  With relatively 
small  changes,  a  nation  that  suffers  from  intense  ethnic 
antagonism  could  be  free  from  that  scourge.  So too,  I  am 
suggesting,  for  terrorism.  If  enclaves  of  like-minded  and 
susceptible people are an indispensable breeding ground for 
terrorism,  then  it  is  easy  to  imagine  a  situation  in  which 
nations, not radically different from the way they are today, 
could be mostly free from terrorist threats. 
25 
N.  IMPLICATIONS AND  LESSONS 
What  are the lessons for policy  and for law? The simplest 
and most important is that if a nation aims to prevent terrorist 
activities, a good strategy is to prevent the rise of enclaves of 
like-minded  people. Many  of  those who become involved in 
terrorist activities could end up doing something else with their 
lives. Their interest in terrorism comes, in many cases, from an 
identifiable set of  social mechanisms (generally from particular 
associations). If  the  relevant  associations can  be  disrupted, 
terrorism is far less likely to arise. 
The  second  lesson has  to  do with  the  idea  of  “political 
correctness.” That idea is far more interesting than it seems. It 
is true that some groups of left-leaning intellectuals push one 
another to  extremes,  and  tow  a kind  of  party  line, in  part 
through  a  limited  argument  pool,  and  in  part  through 
imposing  reputational sanctions  on  those  who  disagree,  or 
even  ostracizing  them.  But  political  correctness  is  hardly 
limited to left-leaning intellectuals. It plays a role in groups of 
all kinds. In its most dangerous forms, it is a critical part of 
groups  that  are  prone  to  violence  and  terrorism,  simply 
because such groups stifle dissent. 
25.  See  Tmur  Kuran  &  Cass R. Sunstein,  Awilabiiity  Cascades  and  Risk 
26.  See Kuran, supra note 3. 
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The third  lesson has to do with the system of  checks and 
balances and even constitutional design. Citizens in democratic 
nations are hardly immune from the  forces  discussed here. 
Within legislatures, civic organizations, and even courts, group 
polarization might well  occur, Nor is this necessarily bad. A 
movement  in  a  more  extreme  direction  might  well  be  a 
movement in a better direction. But serious problems can arise 
when  extremism is  a  product  of  the mechanisms discussed 
here,  and  not  of  learning through  the  exchange  of  diverse 
opinions.  The  institutions  of  checks  and  balances  can  be 
understood as a safeguard against group polarization, simply 
because  those  institutions  ensure  that  like-minded  people, 
operating within a single part of  government, will not be able 
to  move  governmental  power  in  their  preferred  direction. 
Consider, for example, the idea of  bicameralism and the power 
of  the president to veto legislation; through these routes, it is 
possible to  reduce the risk  that government policy will be  a 
product of  the forces I have discussed. 
The fourth lesson has to do with the treatment of  conspiracy, 
including but not limited to terrorist conspiracies. Why does 
the law punish conspiracy as a separate offense, independent 
of  the underlying “substantive” crime? It is tempting to think 
that  this  kind  of  ”doubling up”  is  indefensible,  a  form  of 
overkill. But  if  the act of  conspiring leads people moderately 
disposed toward criminal behavior to be more than moderately 
disposed, precisely  because  they  are conspiring  together,  it 
makes sense, on grounds of  deterrence, to impose independent 
penal9.s. Some courts  have come close  to recognizing this 
point.  The key  point  is  that  the  act  of  conspiracy has  an 
independent effect,  that of  moving people in more  extreme 
directions. The point holds for terrorists as well as for everyone 
else. 
The  discussion also offers some lessons about freedom of 
association in general, showing some of  its many complexities. 
Associational  freedom is of  course an indispensable part  of 
democracy.  No  one  should  deny  that  point.  But  when 
associational  freedom  is  ensured,  group  polarization  will 
27. See callanan  v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,593-94  (1961)  (“Concerted action 
.  . .  decreases the probability that the individuals will depart from their path of 
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inevitably ensue,  as people sort themselves into groups that 
seem  congenial.  From  the  standpoint  of  liberty,  this  is 
extremely important. It is also valuable from the standpoint of 
democracy, not least because any society’s  “argument pool” 
will be expanded by a wide variety of  deliberating groups. If 
groups move to extremes, then social fragmentation may be 
desirable insofar as it ensures that society as a whole will hear a 
wide range of  positions and points of  view. On the other hand, 
freedom  of  association  can  increase  the  risk  of  social 
fragmentation,  and  social  antagonisms,  potentially  even 
violence, can result. 
Almost all of  the time, the risk is worth tolerating. But when 
we  are dealing with  conspiracies  to kill  American  citizens, 
freedom of  association is literally dangerous. Hatred itself  is 
hardly against the law. By  itself  it is no reason for war. But 
when hatred is a product of the social forces outlined here, and 
when  it  makes  terrorism possible,  there is  every  reason  to 
disrupt associations that drive people to violent acts. The line 
between associational freedom and conspiracy is not always 
crisp and  certain. But in the cases I am emphasizing, there is no 
real  puzzle.  When  they  hate  us,  it  is  not  a  product  of 
deprivation,  individual  rage,  or  religiously  grounded 
predisposition; it is a result of  social forces and, much of  the 
time,  self-conscious conspiracies to fuel hatred. A nation that 
seeks  to win a war against terrorism must try to disrupt those 
conspiracies. 